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PREFACE
Herbert Wechslert
A Symposium preceded by an Overview hardly needs a Preface to prepare the reader for the information, critique, and
analyses that lie ahead. It may, however, be of interest to describe
the background of Restatement, Second, of the Law of Judgments and
to add a word about restatement work in general as it has been
approached by the American Law Institute in the last twenty
years.
The first Restatement of Judgments, published in 1942, was
completed in little more than two years with Austin Scott and
Warren Seavey as Reporters and Erwin N. Griswold as Assistant
Reporter. It was, if I may say so, a remarkable achievement, giving the subject for the first time a coherent structure and an
orderly development compatible with the then current systems of
procedure. Only the names of the Reporters make it plausible
that so much was accomplished in so little time.
More than a quarter of a century had passed before the
Council of the Institute concluded, on the basis of a survey of the
caselaw by Professors Benjamin Kaplan and David L. Shapiro,
that a reexamination was in order. Restatement, Second, was
accordingly begun with Professors Kaplan and Shapiro as Reporters and their first submission was presented to the Institute in
1973. By that time, however, Benjamin Kaplan had been
appointed an Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, necessitating his withdrawal as Reporter. Shortly
thereafter Professor Shapiro was stricken by an illness that required his withdrawal too. The entire burden of the work devolved accordingly upon Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., who
had succeeded Professor Kaplan as Reporter in 1973.
It does not depreciate the contribution of the initial Reporters or, indeed, of the able and helpful Advisers, to say that Geoffrey Hazard comes as close as one person can in the collective
enterprise of the restatements to determining the content of this
Restatement, Second. We in the Institute are grateful to him for
his able leadership in the production of a work that we believe to
be of high distinction.
t Director, The American Law Institute. Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law Emeritus, Columbia University. A.B. 1928, City College of New York; LL.B.
1931, Columbia University; LL.D. 1962, University of Chicago; LL.D. 1967, Harvard University; LL.D. 1978, Columbia University.
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As I read the papers in this Symposium, they share upon the
whole the Institute's estimate of the quality of the work, while
raising questions of detail respecting scope, analysis, or discrete
formulations. Professor Hazard is more competent than I to deal
with the objections thus put forth, but I subscribe to his rebuttals
on the major questions raised. The criticism and rejoinder are,
however, welcome indications of the liveliness and the importance
of the field of law involved and the constructive influence a new
Restatement can exert. The Cornell Law Review renders a useful
service by so speedily eliciting this challenging exchange of views.
Professor Martin's Overview addresses in limine the question
of the "proper function of a Restatement," I while acknowledging
that "Restatement (Second) of Judgments, happily enough, will not
generate many contests between the respective champions of the
descriptive and normative approaches." I Given that acknowledgement, I shall not take full time to argue that his antitheses
(between "restating the law"' and stating "what some members [of
the American Law Institute] think it should be"4 or "stating what
the law ought to be rather than what the cases say it is" 5) oversimplify the problem.'
The common law calls on the courts to choose between conflicting lines of doctrine and, within subtle limits to be sure, to
adapt the principles of earlier decisions to changing conditions in
a changing world. The statement of a rule accordingly involves
something more than the conclusion that past cases have so
held -namely, the implicit judgment that our courts today would
not perceive a change of situation or of values calling for the
adaptation of the rule or even for a new departure. Appraisal of
the weight of factors calling for a change is obviously relevant to
that implicit judgment.
The conclusion that follows from these premises is that the
Institute in its deliberations is obliged to weigh all of the considerations relevant to the development of common law that our polity calls on the courts to weigh in theirs, meaning, of course, the
' Martin, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: An Overview, 66
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404, 404 (1981).
2 Id. at 405.
Id. at 404.
SId. n.1.
SId. n.2.
6 For more extensive treatment of the point, see Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A.J. 147, 150-51 (1969); Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of
Policy in the Restatement Work of the American Law Institute, 13 ST. Louis U. L.J. 185, 189-90
(1968).
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courts of last resort under a proper view of the judicial function.
That working formula was approved by the Council of the Institute in 1968 and has, upon the whole, guided our work throughout Restatement, Second. The treatment of Judgments reflects
this approach and evidences, I submit, its utility and wisdom.

